Monday, May 25, 2009
Conclusion
Response to "Peter the Great is not a totalitarian dictator like Hitler"
Response to "Holocaust Doesn't Unite Germans"
Improvement/modernization
Peter the Great and Napoleon: Equality
Hitler and Peter the Great: RULE
The Great Northern War
Friday, May 22, 2009
The influence of internal reforms
Wednesday, May 20, 2009
Peter and Alexis
Tuesday, May 19, 2009
Napoleon and Hitler with nobility/leaders...?
I guess I'm just wondering how differently Napoleon and Hitler interacted with the leading social groups while they were coming to power...
Why didn't the nobility rebel?
Monday, May 18, 2009
Good or Bad?
But to backtrack a little bit--I'm still pretty hung up on the fact that toward the end of his reign Peter began to restore the power of the nobility. What is so characteristic and unique about his reign is that he eliminated so much power from the aristocracy and that he managed to maintain rule and avoid a rebellion even though he completely altered the internal Russian social structure. While there was discontentment among the aristocracy, it was never voiced in a violent manner. Why then did Peter give in? I personally believe that Peter was only able to maintain his power because he was the rightful heir to the throne and the Russian people didn't want to dispute the sanctity of this inheritance. When compared to Hitler whose platform was almost entirely built upon the support of the public, it becomes clear that the only thing that maintained Peter's power was his title. While Peter undeniably changed Russian society, he did not influence the Russian public. What I mean by that is that Hitler completely brainwashed the majority of the German public and got them on his side (as Danielle's post "Tactics to Gain Power" cites that membership to the Nazi party increased from 389,000 in the beginning of 1931 to 800,000 by the end of that year), whereas in Peter's case, the Russian public was on his side (for the most part) by default.
Does this change the influence of Peter's reign or his reputation? To be honest, it's much more impressive when somone comes out of no where and completely imposes his rule and, beyond that, gains SUPPORT than it is for someone to stray from the norm of what their title entails.
Wednesday, May 13, 2009
Peter the Great and Religion
Essentially, Peter simultaneously loosened the regulations of the Church while tightening his personal control over the Church, what I see as sort of killing two birds with one stone because he allows for more enclusion within the Church (which rallies support for his actions) while he gains control over the establishment that now has a larger membership. I have to ask AGAIN...did he do it for the Russian state or for his own reputation?
The Bronze Horseman
St. Petersburg
So I was thinking about how Peter the Great had just uprooted the traditional Russian social structure and lifestyle and I realized that I haven't even written/thought much about St. Petersburg. I mean, while Peter the Great demonstrated his authoritarian power through his social reforms, attempts to modernize Russia and his military pursuits, I think that his establishment of St. Petersburg truly encompasses all of Peter's goals and influences on 17th-18th century Russian society. So St. Petersburg was established on territory that Peter had gained from the Swedes in the Great Northern War. In relocating the Russian capital to St. Petersburg, a territory that Russia had JUST acquired, Peter is again disrupting Russian tradition and showing that the most important thing for him is to insure that his power and the influence and spread of his power is understood by the Russian civilians as well as other European countries (since in moving the capital to St. Petersburg, Peter is encroaching on Western Europe). Peter cares more about his reputation as "Great" then he does about the Russian identity, in fact, I would say that Peter does not care at all about the Russian identity, for he seems to only truly be interested in his ability to influence and change that identity.
I think that what differentiates Peter the Great from Hitler is in their causes. Hitler, although his "cause" was terrible and unimaginably destructive, was extending his influence and his BELIEFS to the German public. To contrast, Peter the Great didn't seem to really have any "cause" except to secure his reputation. While Peter did make very aggressive and influential changes in Russian society, it is clear that his actions were not based upon his considerations of the Russian public. Peter used the Russian public as well as the Russian identity as tools that he could reshape in order to ultimately demonstrate his power and influence, which makes me wonder whether he was more interested in making Russia a great military and European power to strengthen Russia or if he was interested in transforming Russia to a European power to demonstrate his strength.
Sunday, April 26, 2009
Peter the Great vs Hitler (again...AGAIN)
Globalization
Peter the Great vs Hitler (again)
Mass Consumerism and Culture
PETER THE GREAT vs Hitler
Tuesday, April 21, 2009
The Decline of the Soviet Union Continued
The Decline of the Soviet Union
Wednesday, April 1, 2009
Response to In-Class Cold War Simulation
Tuesday, March 31, 2009
The Berlin Wall
Monday, March 30, 2009
European Threat
Was it fair for the Soviet Union to receive control over Eastern Europe? After WWII, the combined effects of the Tehran and Yalta Conferences allowed the Soviet Union to gain control over Eastern Europe. This immediately accelerated the Soviet threat and also eliminated the idea of the balance of power that had shaped the framework of European relations since the Treaty of Utrecht (1713). The combined effect of these conferences essentially divided Europe between Soviet and Western European powers and thus inspired Churchill’s “Iron Curtain Speech”. The combined result of these two conferences was undoubtedly severe and detrimental to the European structure and therefore makes me wonder whether such an extreme forfeit of power (on the Western side) was a rational and just solution or whether it was one out of impulse and fear of another war. Personally, I think that the act was one out of impulse and fear, void of any rational thought whatsoever, particularly with Stalin as a leader. In giving so much power to the Soviets, Western Europe pretty much created their own worst enemy and threat, and though it did avoid an immediate war, it did not create any sort of a solution between the capitalist and communist parties, and thus the rivalry between these two parties remained unresolved. The Soviets had suffered great losses during WWII, and, as history has shown with the Germans, when a country suffers greatly during warfare there is a desire to redeem the power and international threat of that country. Although Churchill denied the inevitability of warfare in his “Iron Curtain Speech”, it seems clear to me that the Soviets were not willing to bargain for peace, but rather, they were still hungry to prove themselves and the greatness of the Communist state to the rest of Europe.
The Atom Bomb
Stalin's Reply to Churchill, March 14, 1946
Sunday, March 29, 2009
"Fuhrer, You Order. We Obey"
Peter the Great
Sunday, March 22, 2009
The Power of Literature during the Great Depression
The chaos of the Great Depression (1929) forced definite economic and political changes such as the abandonment of the gold standard and the implementation of Keynesian policy through the New Deal. While these changes were necessary reactions to the economic travesty, the chaos of this period had significant effects of the environment in which people lived. Such dramatic losses and changes in governmental and economic systems resulted in a very expressive cultural period. The writing created in during the Great Depression was very personal and representative of the experience of the artist. Authors, such as John Steinbeck’s The Grapes of Wrath (video clip) began to deviate from focusing of the subconscious and instead using their writing to write about a common experience (the Great Depression) and thus create a sense of unity and inclusivity—those experiencing hardship from the Great Depression were not alone in their suffering. I wouldn’t go as far to say that this writing the Great Depression offered a sense of hope in the idealized connotation—it did not portray a future with some sort of paradise after such suffering, but I do believe that such honest and real writing provided hope in that it eliminated the feeling of complete and total loss and isolation. While literature is typically used as a form to escape from one’s reality, books such as The Grapes of Wrath mirrored the reality of the audience, thus allowing the audience to escape (to a certain degree) from the feeling of isolation and emptiness that the Great Depression imposed on many.
Monday, March 16, 2009
Summary
Sunday, March 15, 2009
Summary
I absolutely agree with Danielle's statement that Hitler took over Germany at its weakest point--when it was economically unstable due to it's war debts from the Treaty of Versailles, and the confidence in itself was lost. While the similarities between all three governmental systems "rise to power" are undeniable (for all fed off of the unstable situation to gain power), Hitler took the rise of the Nazi party to the next level, particularly with the use of propaganda to stir national sentiment. The master of propaganda was Joseph Goebbel. An example of his "work" shows a happy child with the Nazi flag--thus implying that Nazi children were the happiest children. Once the Nazi party had been established, Goebbel demonstrated his ability to persuade the people through passionate speeches that, much like his artistic propoganda, manipulated people's emotions in order to gain their support.
As Danielle said, the Nazi party came in and was the party that could "save the day" for Germany--restore it's international power and reputation, and the use of propoganda reiterated and solidified that ability of the Nazi party.
919-925
913-919
Summary
Monday, March 9, 2009
888-893
876-888
Sunday, March 8, 2009
865-876
855-862
Monday, February 16, 2009
Summary
In class, we simulated a debate between the three leading Russian political groups: the Mensheviks, Bolsheviks and Octoberists. While these political groups that were all in agreement of the Russian necessity to undergo some form of political change. However, while they shared that common understanding of the deteriorating Russian state, they differed in not only the manner of implementing the necessary governmental change but also in the urgency or timing that this change required. The Mensheviks were tied strongly to Marx’s theory, and thus believed that Russia was not at the appropriate time for Russia to undergo a shift from feudalism to communism, especially since Russia had not yet transitioned to capitalism, which, according to Marx, was an essential component in the proper establishment of communism. To contrast this belief that Russia was not ready to shift to communism was the opinion of the minority, the Bolsheviks, who believed that they could divert from Marx’s complete theory and instead relieve Russia from its dismal political state by forcing Russia to switch to communism through a revolution. While the Mensheviks and Bolsheviks at least had common ground about the inevitability of this revolution and shift to communism, the Octoberists believed that somehow, the communist state could coexist with the current Russian government.
While the Bolsheviks had been the minority, it was their argument that ultimately proved to be the most poignant and gained the most momentum. The Russian people were impatient, having waited and suffered too long with little to no governmental response or help. It is much easier to present the argument that the Bolsheviks did: one that would provide seemingly instant results for the discontented masses. It is much more difficult to tell people to wait and suffer even longer.
844-851
Sunday, February 15, 2009
823-837
Toward the end of the 19th century, Europe experienced an industrial change that intensified European dependency on foreign goods and work, strengthened mass media and reorganized the preexisting capitalist institutions. This European cultural development was founded strongly in the technological development that resulted in a utilization of new materials, particularly steel. The transition from the use of iron to the use of steel shaped the European cultural for it provided more efficient technology that allowed for mass production, thus increasing the European desire for rapid production of manufactured goods. The European demand for rapid access to products was supported by innovation in technology, such as the Thomas Edison’s invention of the incandescent-filament light, which provided seemingly instant results.
Aside from the technological innovations at home, the later part of the 19th century also marked the spread of European influence and thus culture into other countries that were considered less developed in the eyes of the Europeans. This intensified imperialism was greatly supported by the new European dependency on oil (as opposed to the prior dependency on coal). Dependency on oil allowed European industries to move, since they were no longer tied to coal as an energy source. The use of oil as an energy source also allowed Europeans to travel farther faster, thus expediting the European sphere of influence and potential to exploit those less developed countries.
The end of the 19th century was the period in which the foundation was laid for the demand for seemingly instant results. Europeans had faster access to materials, information and countries, and thus grew accustomed to such quick results.
Sunday, February 8, 2009
Summary
As demonstrated in, “A Place in the Sun” (1901), by Kaiser Wilhelm II, the strength of nationalism is a tool used by nations to promote imperialism. Wilhelm explains how through imperialism, citizens focus their attention abroad and on servicing the German nation instead of worrying about “the pettiness which surrounds him in daily life”. Consequently, imperialism would strengthen a nation such as Germany internally and externally, for while people’s attention is refocused to German expansion, Germany is simultaneously achieving an international reputation.
However, despite its power in affecting the people, nationalism was not the only tool used to encourage imperialism. There was the civilizing mission, or, as Rudyard Kipling writes of, “The White Man’s Burden” (1899). While Kipling could either be presenting sarcastic or genuine beliefs, imperialism was undoubtedly presented to citizens as an act to help those less fortunate and uncivilized nations. In his piece, Kipling’s descriptions of the members of imperialized nations as “savages” and “half-devil and half-child” distances those people from the civilized world and would most likely inspire anger or minimally a desire to change (and, as it is implied, therefore help) those “savages”.
While there were other, more political devices used to awaken public support for imperialism, nations rallied the most support through playing the sentiments of the public. Both nationalism and the use of the “civilizing mission” touched the core and identity of the public—whether a national or more spiritual identity, and from this manipulation of human sentiment, imperialism created a foundation of public support.
Tuesday, February 3, 2009
793-806: Imperialism and the Opium Trade
787-793
Saturday, January 31, 2009
Summary
The presence of a common cultural identity allowed for the growth of nationalism, the unification of a country and the establishment of a public voice. As demonstrated by the unification of the German Confederation (1871), there is an undeniable strength that a common culture maintains. The strength of a common culture within a nation allows the role of the public within a nation to be established and thus expedites the social and governmental progression of the nation. The strength of a common culture comes from the fact that it creates a sense of trust within a nation, that the citizens of a nation seek the same goals. As a result of this trusting environment, the public is more willing to have an active voice, such as the British did after the Crimean War. The example of how Great Britain responded to public complaints after the Crimean War demonstrates how the presence of a common culture is conducive to national progression and betterment.
767-780
The Crimean War (1854-1856) revealed both the decline of the Ottoman Empire as well as the reality of the hardship of war. While there was no decisive military victory for the French and British or the Russians, the ultimate end of the Crimean War in a treaty seriously dampened the pride of the Russians and thus maintained the balance of power. What is equally significant to the maintenance of the balance of power that the Crimean War achieved is the publicity that the reality of the Crimean War gained through the photograph of Roger Fenton. While the public could previously hear stories of the hardships of war, the photography of British Fenton revealed the poor conditions that the British army suffered during the Crimean War and inspired a public response. Fenton’s photography brought the reality of the hardships of war home to Britain and inspired not only a public demand for change of the conditions of army but also the artistic movement of realism. The basic foundation of realism is the artistic depiction of their reality without the interference of artistic “interpretations” of this reality. The realist movement was revolutionary not only because of its new artistic implications but also because it demonstrated a new form to communicate the realities of either the army (such as Fenton’s Captain Dames of the Royal Artillery) or the menial tasks of common workers (such as Courbet’s The Stone Breakers). The Crimean War was historically and artistically influential for it allowed the maintenance of the balance of European power as well as being the source of the foundation of realism.
762-767
The divisions of European land in the 19th century left patchwork nations were comprised of either divided states (such as the German Confederation) or disjointed cultures (such as the Habsburg Empire of Austria-Hungary). While the nations were divided in both of these cases, the difference between cultural and geographical division is significant and produces considerably different outcomes. Geographical division, such as in the case of the German Confederation (which was broken into 38 individual states), inspired the creation of a united German identity, and, consequently, a united German nation. To contrast, the cultural division of the Habsburg Empire proved to be its weakness. The empire was attempting to bridge the opposing cultures of Austria and Hungary, a unification which was threatened by Hungarian Kossuth in 1848 and would have successfully broken the ties between Austria-Hungary had it not been for Russian intervention in 1849 which ended the Hungarian revolt. Instead of acknowledging the blatant cultural division between Austria and Hungary, the Habsburg Empire struggled to just barely hold itself together, creating the allusion of a united Austria-Hungary through shared legal institutions in order to avoid the reality that the cultural divide was too powerful to maintain a unified empire.
Sunday, January 25, 2009
Summary
In order to avoid revolution, a government essentially has two options. Great Britain and Prussia demonstrated these two options in the later half of the 19th century, when the governmental systems of both countries were facing opposition from their respective liberal parties. A government must act as Great Britain did (with the Reform Bill of 1867) and compromise with the discontented party, or it can act as Prussia did (with the influence of Bismarck) and unite the country with a common cause, such as nationalism, in order to almost distract the opposing party. Clearly, between these two options (that of compromise and that of “distracting” the opposing party), the former will result in an overall more contented country and will consequently have longer-lasting peace. The act of compromise demonstrates the humbleness of a government and it’s willingness to adhere to the complaints of the people in order to better the state of the country as a whole. To contrast, the use of nationalism to momentarily unite a country only stalls the threat of revolution and allows a ruler (such as Bismarck) to focus on exterior gains (such as Germany) instead of interior problems. Creating a sense of nationalism within a country does not achieve anything aside from temporarily uniting that country; the problems that existed before the presence of that nationalism will still exist after that sense of nationalism fades away. Consequently, if a government truly wants to avoid revolution (and not just stall the threat of a revolution), it only really has one option: to put aside its ego and mold itself to fit the needs of its people.
762-767: Power of Nationalism
The German Confederation could not have been united without Bismarck’s understanding of the power of nationalism. Driven by his desire for power, Bismarck tactfully maintained his ultra-conservative values without bothering the Prussian liberals. While Bismarck did not necessarily go out of his way to compromise his values in order to please Prussian liberals, he managed to avoid revolution by appealing to the uniting factor of liberal and conservative Prussians: their nationality. Ultimately, Bismarck wanted Prussian control over the German Confederation, which, when Bismarck rose to power, was under the combined powers of Austria and Prussia. By engaging in the Seven Weeks War (1866), Bismarck was able to weaken Austria militarily and also establish a sense of Prussian pride. Austria ceded its lands to Prussia and thus allowed Bismarck to create the Northern German Confederation. Following this victory, Bismarck needed to unite Southern German states and again used nationalism as a uniting factor. Bismarck created a conflict between France and Germany in order to unite Southern Germans against France and in support of Prussia. Bismarck understood that when a nation is put in a vulnerable position, the nation is strengthened and unites in order to defeat the threat. Through military victories, Bismarck created a sense of Prussian nationalism, and this maintenance of public support allowed him to expand his power without the threat of revolution from Prussian liberals.